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RESTORING A PUBLIC INTEREST VISION OF 
LAW IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 
MARC ROTENBERG1 
ABSTRACT 
In November 2003, Mr. Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center, lectured at Duke Law 
School on the importance of protecting individual privacy. In his 
remarks, Mr. Rotenberg recounted the successful campaign against 
the government’s Clipper Chip proposal.  He argued that 
successful public interest advocacy in the Internet age requires the 
participation of experts from many fields, public engagement, and a 
willingness to avoid a simple “balancing” analysis. He further 
concluded that privacy may be one of the defining issues of a free 
society in the twenty-first century.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 On November 10, 2003, Mr. Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director 
of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC),2 lectured at Duke 
University School of Law as part of the Information Ecology lecture series 
sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Public Domain.3  In his lecture, 
Mr. Rotenberg spoke on the importance of individual privacy in the Internet 
Age, and specifically discussed the “Clipper Chip” proposal, the 
“Carnivore” network surveillance scheme, the Total Information Awareness 
Program, and the USA PATRIOT Act.  In addition, Mr. Rotenberg 
discussed techniques for establishing effective technology policy, First 
Amendment privacy concerns, and alternative approaches to privacy 
protection.  In concluding his lecture, Mr. Rotenberg postulated that privacy 
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may be one of the defining issues of a free society in the twenty-first 
century.   
¶2 This iBrief is an edited transcript of Mr. Rotenberg’s lecture.4 
I. THE CLIPPER CHIP 
¶3 I’m going to start my talk with you tonight by telling you a story 
about something that happened almost ten years ago.  It concerned a 
proposal for a new encryption standard for the United States, called the 
“Clipper Chip.”5 In the early 1990s, computer firms were beginning to 
realize that they needed to provide some security for people who were 
beginning to transact on a more regular basis on the Internet.  People were 
sending electronic mail; they were engaging in financial transactions; there 
was a lot of talk about the emergence of electronic commerce.  The World 
Wide Web, as we know it today, in fact, had not yet come into existence.  
Mosaic,6 I think, was introduced in the fall of 1993.  But there was a lot of 
interest in cryptography, and there was also a lot of concern.  There was 
concern being expressed by the United States government, by the law 
enforcement community, and the Department of Defense, that this new 
technology of privacy could enable secretive criminal activities that would 
threaten public safety.   
¶4 Now, to set out their argument, for just a moment, they would say, 
“If two people wish to conspire in a criminal act, they could do so now in 
this digital world by encoding their messages so that no third party would 
have access to the content of their communications.”  And this, they said, 
was completely in opposition to how the government had traditionally been 
able, by means of wiretap and electronic surveillance—with court 
supervision, in the context of a criminal investigation—to intercept 
communications and obtain evidence of criminal wrongdoing.  And because 
of this concern, they argued that the widespread unrestricted use of 
encryption technology posed a threat to public safety and national security.  
And they proposed technical standards—not subject to the lawmaking 
                                                     
4 A complete recording of Mr. Rotenberg’s lecture is available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/webcastsArchive.html (last visited Mar. 13, 
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5 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Plans to Push Giving F.B.I. Access in 
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process, to public debate, or to agency rulemaking—that would ensure the 
government access to private communication by an approach that was 
known as Escrowed Key Encryption. 7  What it would have required was 
that every time someone tried to digitally lock their electronic message, 
their business plan, or their financial information a copy of that private key 
would be made available to a government agency, and, if necessary, 
obtained in the course of a criminal investigation to give access to that 
private communication.  That was the Escrowed Encryption proposal. 
¶5 At the time that it was announced, I was doing work with a group of 
computer scientists and technology experts on a range of privacy issues and 
I began to discuss with them their views about the impact of such a 
technical standard.  Now, understand the significance of this proposal.  This 
is not an investigative technique applied to a suspect in the context of a 
particular investigation.  This is a technical standard that becomes the 
cornerstone for all security architecture in the United States and most likely 
around the world, going forward from that point in time.  And as I spoke to 
technical experts such as Ron Rivest (the R of RSA), Whitfield Diffie (the 
Diffie of the Diffie-Hellman public key cryptography standard) and 
others—these are famous cryptographers,8 by the way, and sort of rock stars 
in their own right (I have to do that translation so you understand the 
significance)—they said this was a really bad idea.  
¶6 This is a really bad idea.  Not only because it is an enormous assault 
on privacy—it basically treats every individual as a potential criminal 
suspect—but it also creates a new security flaw that would not otherwise 
exist.  How do we know the circumstances under which someone might 
obtain access to that escrowed key?  In the best of circumstances—in the 
ideal circumstances—it will be through court order, subject to judicial 
oversight with appropriate public reporting which we would hope would be 
preserved if at some future time there might be an actual terrorist event in 
the United States threatening national security that somehow could change 
those legal safeguards.  Those were the ideal circumstances for the use of 
escrowed-key encryption in the early 1990s. 
¶7 We put together a letter that was signed by forty-two experts in law 
and technology and public policy, politely addressed to President Clinton 
urging him to withdraw the Clipper encryption scheme and we posted the 
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letter on the Internet.  And then something extraordinary happened.  People 
began to send email to me when they saw the letter that said, “You’ve made 
a lot of good points here.  I didn’t really understand what this encryption 
proposal was about, but I see what you’re saying.  Would you add me 
please to your letter?”  We said okay, and then we got a few more email 
messages asking to be added to our letter to the President.  Over the course 
of six weeks in 1994, we received more than 50,000 email messages from 
individuals asking to be added to the letter.  And I have to add by the way, 
for some of you newcomers, that 50,000 people on the Internet back in 
1994, that was a big number.  Now, it’s like an AOL chatroom or an REM 
mailing list or something.  I appreciate now it does not seem like much, but 
ten years ago it was a lot.  And we had in effect created the first online 
petition—the first Internet petition around the Clipper encryption scheme—
and we printed this out, consuming as much paper as we possibly could to 
add heft to our document, and delivered it to the White House.  That 
petition, combined with a lot of other factors, including industry opposition 
and a lot of skepticism among European governments about whether this 
would serve their national security interests, led to a decision by the 
administration to withdraw the Clipper encryption scheme.  And it was an 
extraordinary moment, I think, in the history of the Internet. 
¶8 Now, I don’t want to spend so much time gloating over that 
petition.  What I really want to tell you about is what I learned from the 
experience and what lessons it might suggest today for some of the 
challenges that we face in this era of the Patriot Act,9 of Total Information 
Awareness,10 and an ongoing question in this country about how to 
safeguard civil liberties and freedom even as we strive to protect the country 
against future terrorist acts.   
II. LESSONS IN TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
¶9 Here are a few of the things I learned.  The first thing I learned is 
that these issues are hard, and you need help to understand them.  You need 
people from different disciplines and different expertise to come together 
and have discussions about what the implications are of these proposals 
going forward.  To have cryptographers involved in this discussion was 
enormously important for us to be able to assess the impact of the Escrowed 
Encryption scheme.  But we needed legal experts as well.  We had to be 
able to understand how well the federal wiretap law would operate in this 
new electronic environment where information was already provided to a 
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115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
10 See, e.g., John Markoff & John Schwartz, Many Tools of Big Brother Are 
Now, Up and Running, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at C1 (discusses the scope of 
the Total Information Awareness project). 
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government agency that might have otherwise required a warrant at the 
outset, before it could be obtained.  And we needed people who had an 
understanding from a comparative law approach—how what the U.S. was 
proposing to do compared with what Europe was doing or with what Asian 
governments might be doing.  All of these perspectives, I would argue, 
increasingly come together as we try to understand the impact of technology 
on law and civil liberties broadly.   
¶10 I would also say that we needed to involve a process of public 
engagement.  There were in the early 1990s probably only a handful of 
people in Washington who understood the significance of cryptography 
policy for a world of network computers, electronic commerce, or the rapid 
adoption of electronic mail.  There may have been more up at Fort Mead,11 
but that’s technically not within Washington, D.C.  It was very important 
for our efforts to be able to engage the public and to reach people on an 
issue that, at the outset to many, seemed arcane, seemed abstract, seemed 
unrelated to the policy process of Washington and Congressional hearings 
and the talk shows and so forth.  It was precisely because this debate was 
taking place at the outskirts that the need to engage the public was all the 
more critical.  
¶11 A third point from our early experience with the Clipper Chip, 
which I think many people in the IP community have come to realize in the 
last few years, is that technology is a very powerful way of creating policy.  
It is a very powerful way of making law.  Now, Larry Lessig probably said 
this most famously in his book Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace,12 
where he argued that by code we create coercive powers much like law 
creates coercive powers, but when I wrote What Larry Doesn’t Get,13 my 
article a couple of years ago for the Stanford Technology Law Review, the 
observation I was making was that in fact this wasn’t new.  This was 
something that many of us in the privacy community had come to 
understand in the early 1990s, when we were confronting a proposal put 
forward by the federal government of enormous impact that would never be 
debated in Congress, that would never be the subject of an up or down vote, 
that no one could write to their elected representative and say, in effect, 
“Please vote this way or please vote that way on this matter.”  Increasingly 
in this realm, technology plays an extraordinarily important role in shaping 
the structure of this new electronic environment. 
                                                     
11 Fort Mead, Maryland is home to the National Security Agency. 
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¶12 We found ourselves also being asked to reconcile competing 
interests.  Now, Duke Law School Professor Jamie Boyle14 is going to hear 
from me something that I often say, and I’m sorry for repeating this, but it’s 
something I feel very strongly about and am generally pleased that over 
EPIC’s ten years of existence we have tried very hard to avoid using the 
phrase, “We need to balance competing interests.”  Now, the concept of 
balance is very inviting in the policy world.  In my office, I sit and I watch 
C-SPAN all day long.  Okay, that may explain some things about me, but 
I’m not going to go there tonight.  And I have noticed that when members 
of Congress really don’t know much about an issue, they will come to the 
floor of the House or come to the floor of the Senate and they will drop their 
voices an octave or so and say, “We need to balance these two competing 
interests,” as if there is some great wisdom in recognizing that often times 
in the policy process there are competing interests.  To say that you need to 
balance them, I would argue, really tells you very little about outcomes.  I 
was actually counting yesterday when former Vice President Al Gore spoke 
in Constitution Hall in Washington on freedom and security after September 
11th.  He gave a great speech, by the way, but I was actually counting the 
number of times that he used the word “balance” and he used it only once, 
and in passing, and it was probably the fewest uses of that word in a speech 
on freedom and security after September 11th from any politician that I’ve 
heard recently.   
¶13 When we confronted the issue of privacy in the context of the 
Clipper encryption scheme, we could not say that we needed to balance 
privacy and security.  Both interests are substantial, and we needed a 
proposal or a response that recognized that both interests needed to be 
protected in this online environment.  And we found ourselves, after 
Clipper, often times in discussions where people said, “Well, privacy is 
important but so is the First Amendment;” “Privacy is important but so is 
open government;” “Privacy is important but so is this other thing.”  And on 
many of these issues we came to realize that if you look closely there may 
be a way to pursue both interests simultaneously.  In other words, in my 
view, the best resolution of many of these difficult policy challenges is not 
to conceive of a zero sum arrangement that asks us to give up on the one 
hand what we gain on the other but rather solutions that seek to preserve 
both interests.   
III. ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
¶14 I’ll just jump ahead a little bit and tell you that one of the things I 
came to realize very quickly about trying to reconcile competing privacy 
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and First Amendment claims is the very important role that anonymity 
plays, both in law and in technology.  I became fascinated with a series of 
Supreme Court cases going back to 1960, the first of which was Talley v. 
California,15 where the Court considered the question of whether the State 
could compel a person to disclose their identity on a hand-bill that they 
would circulate.  There are lots of arguments for this law.  I mean you could 
say that a person may engage in defamatory conduct and certainly you want 
to be able to identify the author of a defamatory work.  But, significantly, in 
the three cases since 1960 in which the Supreme Court has addressed this 
question,16 each time it has struck down statutes that compel individuals to 
disclose their identity. 
¶15 Now, let’s think about this for a moment.  These are people 
engaging in speech acts in the public realm who are simultaneously seeking 
to protect their privacy.  The core privacy interest must surely be the ability 
to withhold disclosure of identity.  When the Court granted cert a couple of 
years ago in a case called Watchtower Bible v. Village of Stratton,17 the 
question was whether the city of Stratton could require individuals who 
were going door to door—and they had in mind Jehovah’s Witnesses 
knocking on private homes—to first obtain a permit from the mayor of the 
city before knocking on the door of a private residence.  I saw that case 
going up to the Court and I said, “We are going to get involved in that—
that’s a very important privacy case.”  And people said to me, “That’s a 
great thing, you know.  I don’t like those people knocking on our doors. I 
think you should get behind them.”  And I said, “That’s so twentieth 
century.” 
¶16 I said, “Privacy, you have to understand, is about controlling 
disclosure of identity.  It's about enabling participation in political life and 
expressing your views.  We are going to side with the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses.”  And I can tell you we wrote a pretty good amicus in that case, 
and I can tell you a story about the oral argument.  It was a great oral 
argument.  Justice O’Connor asked the attorney for the village of Stratton at 
one point about how this system operated. And she said to the attorney for 
the Village, “So if I understand this correctly, to go door to door for any 
cause”—which was the language in the ordinance—“I would need to first 
obtain the mayor’s permission. Is that correct, counsel?” And the attorney 
for the Village of Stratton said “Yes, your honor, that is correct.”  And 
Justice O’Connor paused and said “What if I think we need a new mayor?” 
Right.  You get it? 
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¶17 This really is an illustration, I think, of the point that sometimes in 
the policy process when we face competing interests to simply assume, 
“Well, if we are going to engage in First Amendment activities you need to 
sacrifice some privacy.”  Often times that’s not correct.  And perhaps even 
more significantly the courts have recognized this.  The courts recognized 
this, for example, in the 1958 case of NAACP v. Alabama,18 where the State 
of Alabama was trying to obtain the membership lists of the organization, 
which they viewed as a foreign corporation.  And rather than simply 
requiring the officers of the corporation to register with the State Secretary, 
they said, “We want all the members’ names.”  Well, imagine the impact 
that might have on organizations that may be unpopular or controversial 
that are trying to organize on important and emerging political issues. 
Privacy in many circumstances comes to the aid of other critical values such 
as the First Amendment and political participation.   
¶18 I want to talk about another theme that I’ve picked up over the 
years working in this field and that is the relationship between personal 
privacy and government secrecy.  I get calls from the press, and they say, 
“Some organization is trying to get private memos from a federal agency 
disclosed to the public.  Aren’t you concerned about that?”  And on one of 
these calls I actually said, “Well no.  Actually, that was our organization 
that filed the Freedom of Information Act request to obtain the information 
from the government.”  But it is interesting how often people conflate 
privacy and secrecy.  And they say while just as individuals have the right 
to engage in private communications, so too should government actors be 
able to engage in private communication.  But in fact, U.S. law views those 
two relations very differently.  I can take you back to 1974, which was the 
post-Watergate era of reform in the U.S. Congress.  A lot of good 
legislation was passed by the Congress in 1974.  Two bills were of 
particular significance for my organization.  One was the Privacy Act,19 
which protected the privacy of personal information held by the federal 
government.  The other was a series of strong amendments to the Freedom 
of Information Act,20 which basically said that public records held by 
government agencies should be widely available to the public.   
¶19 Now, you look at those two events, both taking place in 1974, and 
you think to yourself, “You know what’s up; are these people 
schizophrenic?”  You know, one day they’re passing privacy laws, the next 
day they’re passing open records laws.  I mean, it’s like one group of 
Congressmen vote the first day and they go home and talk to the 
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(last visited Mar. 25, 2004) 
20 See, e.g., Elias Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended 
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constituents, and then another group vote the next day. The point was in 
1974, when Congress passed the Privacy Act and strengthened the Freedom 
of Information Act, they were saying that personal information is entitled to 
protection and should not be improperly disclosed.  (I don’t think they 
anticipated that 30 years later Linda Tripp would get a $600,000 judgment 
in a Privacy Act case.  But even that could happen in protecting privacy 
rights under this legislative scheme.)  But public information should, in fact, 
be widely available, and Congress made this clear as well.  And so we have 
also pursued, through EPIC Freedom of Information Act requests, where we 
have sought the disclosure of many types of records held by the government 
agencies.  We obtain the information concerning—this is a great name, by 
the way—an Internet surveillance scheme called “Carnivore.”  Now, they 
reassured us after these records were disclosed, when the program was 
explained, that it could have been worse.  They had another program in 
mind called “Omnivore.”  But Omnivore, you see, was not sufficiently 
focused as a wiretapping technique.  They wanted to assure us that only the 
information properly being sought under the warrant would be obtained.  
Hence, “Carnivore.”   
¶20 There’s this whole name change thing happening, by the way, 
around a lot of these issues that’s really interesting.  John Poindexter 
announced the Total Information Awareness Program, which was pretty 
Orwellian, and then he had a website that had the Latin phrase, “information 
is power,” and then a weird Masonic temple with an eye on top.  I don’t 
think this is the way to assure people that you’re not about some Big 
Brother operation.  They also decided to change the name for that program.  
They went from “Total Information Awareness” to “Terrorism Information 
Awareness.”   
¶21 Now, none of the functional capability was changed, but we were 
so gladdened by the good news we actually put an item on our website that 
led, “Name Changed, Problem Solved,” right?  Because, hey, there was no 
more “Total Information Awareness.”  One other comment on this whole 
name thing: we were doing Freedom of Information Act requests 
surrounding the FBI's legislative proposal to require communications 
service providers to ensure that their products could be wiretapped.  This 
was the telephone corollary of the debate that was taking place around the 
encryption standard but for the traditional analog telephone network.  And 
the law enforcement community expressed concern that with advances in 
the communication network and so forth that they couldn’t even do the old-
fashioned wiretap, so they wanted to ensure that services would ensure the 
functionality of wiretap capability.  They had a legislative proposal called 
the “Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.”21  We 
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obtained the documents for the original proposal, which had actually not 
surfaced in Washington before consideration and vote on the bill in 1994.  
The code name for this proposal—I’m not making this up—was “Operation:  
Root Canal.”  You get it?  
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO PRIVACY PROTECTION 
¶22 One of the other things we’ve tried to do in our work at EPIC is to 
think broadly about different approaches to emerging challenges in the 
legislative and regulatory realm, and by this what I have in mind is really a 
comparative approach.  Privacy turns out to be a very exciting topic, in part, 
because so many countries today are wrestling with privacy issues.22  India 
is considering legislation for private sector data practices.  Argentina 
recently passed legislation.  Japan is about to adopt legislation.  There are 
questions in Eastern Europe relating to the adoption of data protection 
standards and whether they’re fully compliant with the requirements of the 
EU Data Directive.23  All around the world, different countries are 
struggling with the question of how best to protect privacy in this age of 
information and global commerce.  We have used that as an opportunity to 
explore and compare all these different models.  In some situations, for 
example, you might look to the European Data Directive standard and say, 
“It makes a lot of sense to have a comprehensive approach to privacy 
protection that also allows consumers in the marketplace, whether they have 
cable subscriber records or magazine subscription records, to be afforded a 
common standard for privacy protection in the information they provide to 
get that service.”  We don’t take that approach in the U.S.  In the U.S., 
which has followed more of a sectoral approach, we might say, for certain 
factors relating to the adopting of cable legislation in the early 1980s, 
“We’ll provide privacy protection for cable subscriber records, but not for 
magazine subscription records.”  And so that’s one kind of a comparison 
that gives you some insight into how different countries respond to 
emerging privacy challenges. 
¶23 But in other areas, for example wiretapping in the United States, we 
actually have just about the toughest laws on wiretapping in the world.  Not 
only in terms of the showing that government needs to make before it may 
engage in electronic surveillance, but also in the extensive reporting that’s 
required any time electronic surveillance is undertaken by a U.S. federal 
agent.  And at EPIC we track all that information.  I can tell you, for 
                                                     
22 See generally EPIC, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL 
SURVEY OF PRIVACY LAWS AND DEVELOPMENTS (2002). 
23 Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281), 31, available at 
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example, how wiretapping activity in the United States in 2002 compared 
with 2001 or, for that matter, twenty years earlier.  You can’t do that with 
any other country.  And that comes about in part because of a particular 
approach that the United States took toward the protection of privacy in the 
communications environment more than 30 years ago. 
¶24 One of the reasons I think it’s particularly important to value a 
comparative approach to these emerging policy issues is that these are real 
policy alternatives.  Think about it this way:  if you ask yourself the 
question, “What kind of privacy protection should we have for DRMs?” 
(Digital Rights Management)—several people asked me about that topic 
today—if you take a narrow, U.S.-centric approach to this, you might say, 
“Well, we’ve done basically nothing, but some people have written some 
interesting articles that maybe we should look at and consider in the 
development of some privacy policies for DRMs.”  I mean that’s not much, 
unfortunately, of a policy discussion; it’s very difficult through the 
legislative process to say, “There’s an important approach that maybe you 
should consider.”  But if you were to say instead, “On DRM privacy, the 
European Commission is very interested in consumer safeguards, consumer 
privacy in this digital environment, and has recommended the adoption of a 
directive to try to safeguard privacy even as these new services go forward,” 
suddenly you have a comparison.  You can look at an approach in the 
United States; you can look at an approach in the European Union.  Maybe 
there’s a third approach from Japan, or maybe from Australia.  You begin a 
policy process that enables debate and enables choice.  It may be at the end 
of the day that the United States, through its Congress says, “Well, thank 
you very much for that, but we prefer our approach and that’s the way we’re 
going to go,” and that could happen.  But I’m at least hopeful that 
increasingly the U.S. courts and perhaps even the U.S. Congress will look 
abroad to new approaches to emerging policy issues.  Many of you probably 
saw the opinion this summer in Lawrence v. Texas24 by Justice Kennedy.  I 
mean, it was a remarkable opinion—this was the decision striking down the 
Texas homosexual sodomy statute—it was a remarkable opinion, in part 
because of the outcome.  It was also a remarkable opinion because Justice 
Kennedy cited to the European Convention on Human Rights,25 and some 
of the Article 8 cases concerning the protection of privacy, which has 
opened the door a bit to what will be a very valuable process of enabling 
more comparison of different approaches to privacy protection.  In my own 
field, in the privacy field, I think we’ve benefited greatly from the work of a 
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lot of scholars who have helped us understand how different countries 
responded to emerging challenges.26 
V. THE PATRIOT ACT 
¶25 That’s an overview of EPIC, and I want to say a few words now 
about the challenges we face post September 11th under the Patriot Act, and 
then actually I’d welcome your questions and your comments, but I thought 
it would be helpful at the outset to tell you a bit about our approach to 
public interest litigation.  It’s been for us extraordinarily exciting. We find 
ourselves before Congressional committees, in courts, before agencies, 
basically every opportunity we have to pursue a discussion or debate or 
participate in a policy resolution of one the issues of concern to us, we will 
try to pursue.  It’s possibly for that reason that I can say to you today that 
we face no greater challenge than we face resulting from the horrific events 
of September 11th.  I can say that in part, because I was in Washington on 
that day and also because the flights originated from Boston, which is where 
I grew up.  But also after September 11th, there were subsequent 
developments with the anthrax scare that were almost as unsettling as what 
had happened on that day.  I remember speaking on a panel in mid-October 
of 2001 at the National Press Club with the former Director of the CIA 
James Woolsey who had just published an editorial27 that day in the Wall 
Street Journal arguing that the presence of aeriolized anthrax in the United 
States established Saddam’s complicity in the events of September 11th. 
This was October 2001, and as many of you may be sensitive to, there are 
still a lot of questions to be answered about how decisions were reached 
regarding U.S. intervention in Iraq.   
¶26 Now, I’m not going to have that conversation with you tonight, but 
I do want to convey to you what it was like in Washington in the fall of 
2001, when the Patriot Act was being debated. After the—well, even 
before—the anthrax hit the city, two days after September 11th, September 
13th, Utah Senator Orrin Hatch went to the floor of the Senate with a 
proposal (the Anti-Terrorism Act28) that had been put together by the 
Attorney General, and said that within a week, we must pass this legislation 
to ensure the safety of the American people against future terrorist acts.  
And it’s a little too easy, I think, with the benefit of hindsight, not to 
appreciate how much people in Washington felt under attack at that point in 
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time, and the willingness to give the federal government whatever authority 
it felt that it needed to safeguard the country, I think was very genuine.  
Particularly for members of Congress who were thinking not only about 
themselves, but also about their families, and about their constituents.  
¶27  I was very proud of the fact that the next day, my former boss, 
Senator Patrick Leahy from Vermont, went to the floor of the United States 
Senate and said, “Even with this great challenge that our country faces 
today, we must be equally resolute in ensuring the protection of basic civil 
liberties, because if today we sacrifice those freedoms, then surely the 
terrorists will have won.”  Well, of course, in the weeks that followed, that 
phrase became overused—“If we did not go shopping at Tyson’s Corner, 
the terrorists would have won”—but when it was first spoken on the floor of 
the U.S. Senate, it was significant, because it was a signal on the part of 
some members of Congress that there would be at least some debate before 
the Patriot Act was adopted.  Now, it’s true that the Act went through in six 
weeks.  It went through without a hearing.  There was a significant shift that 
took place in the position of the House of the Representatives, where a 
fairly good bill that had been agreed to by the House Judiciary Committee29 
was taken off the table at the last moment, and the final bill as enacted 
substituted in its place.  But there was at least an opportunity for some 
debate and discussion.   
¶28 Nonetheless, the Patriot Act poses enormous challenges to the 
protection of privacy and civil liberties in this country.  Many of the 
traditional safeguards that exist in the Fourth Amendment, and particularly 
for electronic surveillance, are intended to provide oversight and 
accountability when the government goes about the business of conducting 
investigations.  Now, oversight and accountability are not forms of 
prohibition; they do not say, “You may not obtain access to this 
information;” “You may not speak to these witnesses;” “You may not enter 
these homes;” or “You may not go to those offices for relevant records.”  
There’s hardly anything in any privacy statute that does anything like that.  
Invariably what privacy laws try to do is construct a series of firewalls that 
say, “To get access to this information you need, generally speaking, to 
establish probable cause.”  There should be some judicial oversight so that 
the prosecutor is not acting on his own authority.  There should be some 
notice at an appropriate moment in time to the target of the investigation.  If 
you are entering a home, generally speaking, you should announce your 
presence.  If you are conducting electronic surveillance, when the 
investigation is concluded, the target of the investigation has the right to 
know that they were the subject of a court ordered wire tap, and there 
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should be public reporting so the public is aware of how the government is 
using these investigative authorities. 
¶29 I told you just a few moments ago, that one of the great 
achievements of the United States in the privacy realm was the elaborate 
public reporting for the use of electronic surveillance.  But one of the things 
that happened as a result of the Patriot Act was that a lot of the electronic 
surveillance was shifted from the traditional Title III report, which runs 
about a hundred and thirty pages, and is provided to the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts and is available on the EPIC website, to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act report, which is a one page letter from 
the Attorney General that summarizes in approximately three paragraphs 
how an extraordinary surveillance authority has been used by the 
Department of Justice during the past year.30  What the Patriot Act did, in 
many separate areas, was to remove, reduce, and push to the outskirts these 
various safeguards that had been established in privacy laws going back 
more that thirty years.  It reduced the accountability of government.  It 
increased the secrecy of government, even as it diminished the privacy of 
the Americans who would become subject to this authority.  
¶30 Now, it has been argued, of course, that in times of national crisis 
power tends to shift from the individual to the executive.  During wartime 
perhaps we are used to the President assuming more power, and we have 
certainly observed some curtailment of some civil liberties, although I 
would caution you on that point about allowing the descriptive to collapse 
into the normative.  And of course by that I mean that the restriction of civil 
liberties during wartime is not necessarily something that we should allow 
to happen.  
¶31 There is a second aspect to the post-Patriot Act developments, 
which I want to say a few words on and then maybe this would be a good 
place to stop.  And that is that unlike law, which creates authority for 
surveillance and can swing back and forth as a pendulum between wartime 
and peace time, technologies of surveillance, I would argue, tend to follow 
historical arcs.  By this I mean, if you make a decision in 2002 to establish a 
system of public video surveillance in the nation’s capital, in Washington, 
D.C., such that any person standing in front of the Washington Monument, 
which is by the way not only the potential target of a terrorist act but also a 
enormously significant meeting point for many political movements 
throughout this country’s history—or the Lincoln Memorial for that 
matter—if you make a decision to put in place technologies of surveillance 
it is very difficult to understand the circumstances under which that 
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surveillance scheme would be removed.31  In other words, the Patriot Act is 
an act of Congress, certain provisions can sunset as they do in 2005, the Act 
itself can be repealed as former Vice President Gore recommended 
yesterday, but the technologies of control, the technologies of identification, 
the technologies of surveillance, and the technologies of monitoring and 
tracking, like the Clipper encryption scheme of 10 years ago, can be put in 
place and remain in place with little public debate or discussion. 
¶32 And so the thought I’d like to leave you with, and certainly the 
focus of much of EPIC’s work in the years ahead, will be to better 
understand how these technologies of control are to be controlled.  How to 
bring public accountability, transparency, and democratic control to these 
new forms of state control that seem to exist outside of the legislative 
process.  It is an enormous challenge, but it is a very important challenge, 
because the one thing I have learned working in this area for more than ten 
years is that although people have different definitions of privacy, to some 
extent everybody understands that this is an important issue.  And I’d like to 
suggest to you today and close with this thought, that privacy in fact may be 
one of the defining issues of a free society in the twenty-first century. 
VI. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
¶33 Q (Prof. Boyle):  EPIC has covered a variety of different issues, 
public and private, technological and legal, national and international; I’d be 
really interested in hearing your, top three or four, in terms either of the 
degree of threat or perhaps the degree to which you think they haven’t 
received public attention but should have. It would be particularly useful if 
you could concentrate on things you’ve been focusing on over the past six 
months or a year. 
¶34 A:  Alright, well identification is at the top of the list.  Systems of 
identification, the use of biometrics, in passports and visas.  We’re also 
involved in a case the Court recently granted cert in, which is Hiibel v. Sixth 
Judicial District of Nevada,32 and if you’re interested in this case you can 
go visit our website.  This case is about a Nevada statute33 that basically 
allows the police to arrest a person in a public space who is suspicious—but 
not with probable cause that they have committed a crime—and fails to 
present identification.  And this is a statute that is similar to statutes that 
exist in many of the states which say that you can be arrested because you 
do not say to the police who you are.  We think this is an enormously 
important case right now because it would create in effect the legal 
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authority—combined with the technologies—that would more frequently 
require individuals to disclose their identity under any number of 
circumstances unrelated to criminal activity.  Again a person standing at the 
Washington Monument walks around it a couple of times.  The police 
approach the individual and say “Excuse me, can I see some identification?”  
The person says “I don’t have to say to you who I am.”  The police arrest 
the person for acting suspiciously and failing to present identification.  That 
individual could have been walking around the Washington Monument, 
because he was planning to meet his spouse or a friend who said she would 
be at the Washington Monument at that point in time. I mean these are the 
kinds of factual scenarios we need to begin to think about in the context of 
identification.   
¶35 A second big topic has to do with the conflict of privacy regimes.  
And this arises right now between the United States and Europe, over the 
requirement that the United States has imposed on European air carriers that 
they provide to U.S. law enforcement agencies, prior to arrival in the United 
States, the PNRs,34 which are the passenger records, on all of their 
passengers.  Now, the Europeans have said that they have a privacy law that 
prevents the disclosure of this information absent some clear showing that 
someone is a suspect in a criminal investigation.  The United States has 
said, “If you do not provide this information to us, we will revoke the 
landing rights for the European airlines.”  So you have a very interesting 
conflict between the efforts of the Europeans to safeguard privacy under 
law and the demands that the U.S. is making on the homeland security front.   
¶36 Finally, since you asked me for three, a critical test on so many of 
these emerging privacy issues is the ongoing challenge of promoting public 
engagement.  One of the things I also learned about privacy in the early 
days is that there was a lot of good law that had largely been put together by 
elites—academics, government officials, smart thoughtful people, but in a 
fairly small community—without much public understanding or support.  
And I came to the view that sustained political reform requires a broad 
constituency.  That even the best of policies, without public support, will 
not easily endure.  So here’s a remarkable statistic for you.  The Federal 
Trade Commission announced a do-not-call list.  If you don’t want a 
telemarketer to contact you at home, the FTC gave you an 800 number to 
call and a website to go to express your preference not to receive these calls 
at home.  Well, I thought 50,000 people was a big number ten years ago.  
The FTC got 50 million people to sign up for the do-not-call list.  That’s 
more people than voted for the last president of the United States.  
¶37 Q (Prof. Boyle):  Nearly as many people as were on Napster. 
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¶38 A: That’s a big number.  Yes, we’re getting up there.  We’re almost 
up to Napster.  But 50 million.  Three issues.  Anyone else? 
¶39 Q (Prof. David Lange35):  Marc, if I may, let me offer a thought—
not a very well formed thought—and see what reaction it might get from 
you.  When Warren and Brandeis wrote their article36 on privacy at the end 
of the nineteenth century, they were thinking about the common law as an 
instrument for responding to the problems that they identified.  By the 
middle of the twentieth century we were beginning, slowly, but with some 
deliberate speed, to work out privacy issues in terms of the First 
Amendment.  Today, when you speak of privacy, and you think to speak of 
it in constitutional terms, I think you think of it principally in terms of the 
First Amendment, though the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment 
play some role, and perhaps the Sixth Amendment as well.  Certainly, in 
some sense, as we come to the end of the twentieth century, we’re 
beginning to work these things out on the ground, and as you say, in terms 
of technology.  But one thought I’ve had for some time is that we lack a key 
piece of constitutional structure for dealing with privacy issues.  We’ve 
tortured the First Amendment into a kind of uneasy submission to the needs 
that we have for privacy protection.  And it occurs to me that the First 
Amendment isn’t big enough, isn’t capacious enough, to do the job.  And 
more than that, that the First Amendment, in the process of its torturous 
submission, has actually been to a very great degree bent out of shape.  
Which brings me to this suggestion, that I would be interested in having 
your expert reaction to: perhaps what we need to do is to amend the First 
Amendment, so that we deal more deliberately and more specifically and 
straightforwardly with privacy issues than we now do.  This is an 
opportunity for all of us, but particularly for activists like you to frame 
oppositions that can be made central to the debate in a way that the cases 
don’t actually allow us to bring forth.  I think of the case involving the 
sodomy statute in Texas.  Which is in some sense a First Amendment case, 
though it’s more of a broader case than that.  It's actually a case grounded in 
some principle that I think has no entirely clear provenance in the 
Constitution as an occasion for just that kind of amendment.  I’ll stop here, 
because you get the drift, and I’m more curious about your reaction than I 
am hearing myself propose the thought. 
¶40 A: Well, I agree with you of course. I think the First Amendment 
has not always had an easy relationship with privacy, certainly.  I’ve tried to 
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make the best case where the privacy interests and the First Amendment 
interests are largely congruent, but of course there are a lot of cases where 
that’s not as it is.  You know, I’m thinking a little bit about this 
constitutional question, and I’m struck by the decision of the German 
Constitutional Court in 1983 essentially announcing a right of informational 
self-determination, very much like the Brandeis/Warren article at the latter 
part of the nineteenth century, but rooted in the German Constitution.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court came somewhat close to that in Whalen v. Roe,37 which 
was an opinion in the late 1970s, looking at the automation of personal 
information and whether people had a constitutional right to control the 
disclosure of that information.  But I don’t think we got there.  It has been 
the experience of many people working in the privacy field that the U.S. 
Constitution doesn’t always provide the best material for privacy protection.  
We have some very good decisions, and I mentioned those in the anonymity 
realm but in a lot of other areas, we look to statutory frameworks, the acts 
of Congress and the states.  When I was putting together the casebook38 on 
information privacy with Daniel Solove, we quite purposefully moved early 
on in the text from the constitutional analysis and from the tort analysis to 
what we described as the modern regime for privacy protection based on 
statutory law.  Now, it is interesting to see, and this has certainly been a 
development in the last few years, some of the stakeholders that are 
concerned about the impact of privacy laws, such as marketing companies 
and banks, have looked to the First Amendment as a way to attack these 
statutory regimes by arguing, for example, that they restrict the ability of a 
company to communicate with its customer.  It’s an interesting First 
Amendment claim, but I don’t know that I would go out and recommend 
amending the First Amendment.  I suspect that will get me into quite a bit 
of trouble with the civil liberties community. 
¶41 But the only other point to mention on this, and also in with the 
spirit of the German decision, is that the European Convention—I want to 
make sure I get this right cause I get it confused with the Canadians—but in 
2001, the Europeans established a new constitution, a charter, the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights39, which includes a provision—I think it's 
Article 8—on a right to informational privacy.  I mean, they simply 
announced this new constitutional claim.  It follows a bit from similar 
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language that can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights40 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights41 and some of 
the other international instruments.  But I suspect that the better approach, 
rather than trying to amend the First Amendment, is maybe for Whalen v. 
Roe to be reconsidered, or maybe to announce a new right.  Or not. 
¶42 Q: You mentioned that one of your main concerns was 
identification, and specifically the technologies put in place to perform 
identification.  So, I guess one bright spot in all of this is that Tampa, which 
at some point after 2001 had installed cameras everywhere, face recognition 
software, I think primarily for security at the Super Bowl.  About two and a 
half months ago, Tampa decided for various reasons that they were going to 
remove, at the very least, the face recognition software.  Do you have any 
insight on this decision? 
¶43 A: Well, it was actually more than two and a half months ago, it 
was in the spring.  I actually debated the fellow from Visionics, his name is 
Joe Attick—very smart guy, by the way—who started this company on face 
recognition and the theory was that you can identify people in public spaces 
by capturing the topology of their face and matching it with a digitized 
image.  John Poindexter, by the way, had a very similar proposal in Total 
Information Awareness.  I mean, what was extraordinary, by the way, about 
Total Information Awareness was not only the desire to accumulate all the 
data that could be accumulated, but also to create new means of 
identification to create data that didn’t otherwise exist.  So, I, of course, was 
pleased that they backed off.  I actually never thought that face recognition 
would become a particularly popular means of identification.  It’s not very 
reliable.42 But I think the real challenge we face is that over time other 
forms of identification will become reliable.  Iris scans, for example, can be 
done at a distance of about 3 to 4 feet, and that turns out to be a pretty good 
way to do identification in public spaces.  I don’t know how many of you 
saw the movie Minority Report.  Tom Cruise is going into the Gap, or he’s 
getting on the Metro and there is an iris scan device for identification.  (This 
is a wonderful field, because one of the ways you study, you can almost get 
credit, is for going to the movies.  I  mean, top 3 movies for privacy: 
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Minority Report, Enemy of the State, Gattaca.  And plus, they’re good 
movies, you know, it’s not a bad thing.)  So, anyway, I don’t think face 
recognition, as the technology is currently described, is actually likely to 
gain much acceptance. But you’ll see other techniques, including one, 
interestingly, that measures radiant heat from the face, which turns out to be 
actually somewhat more reliable than the topology of the face. 
¶44 Q:  I had a question about this idea of emerging technologies.  It’s 
the nature of these technologies, something like Moore’s Law, where 
computers just multiply rapidly in terms of their capabilities.  So when 
you’re looking at a technology that’s new, how do you imagine what the 
possibilities are for a technology that is in place.  In other words, cameras 
on the monuments in Washington mean one thing now; they could mean a 
very different thing in 30 years. And once those technologies are 
established, as you’ve been saying, it’s very difficult to remove them.  How 
do you take into account the things that aren’t? 
¶45 A:  Well it’s an interesting question.  It’s actually a question 
somewhat hopefully that the U.S. Congress has focused on more intently in 
the last few years.  We did some work with the Congress around the so 
called E-government initiatives to require federal agencies to conduct what 
are called privacy impact assessments.  And in the design of new record 
systems, they now ask a series of questions to try to evaluate the privacy 
impact of these systems.  This is obviously an application of a technology, 
but you ask what kind of information is going to be obtained, who is it 
going to be disclosed to, under what circumstances will it be disclosed.  
And this is a way, I think, to promote a bit more public discussion about the 
scope and impact of these systems.  Again, not with the goal of saying, “Oh, 
you can’t use technology in the federal government,” but rather trying to 
provide some means of oversight.  One of the things we did, post-
September 11th, was to bring some Congressional scrutiny to bear on the 
Transportation Security Agency’s proposal for a “Computer Assisted 
Passenger Profiling System.”43  We said, “Where’s the privacy impact 
statement for the Passenger Profiling System?  It’s a government record 
system, there should be a privacy impact statement, so at least we can talk 
about it.”  And they said, well, they hadn’t completed the privacy impact 
statement.  Well, boy, if you’re a Washington lawyer and you hear 
something like that, you’re already ordering drinks for people.  I mean that 
was actually really good news for us.  So even before we get to the debate 
about whether or not CAPPS II should go forward, we’re saying, “Why 
can’t you disclose the impact statement, like the 9-11 commission?”  But I 
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think that’s what you try to do.  You try to evaluate and create mechanisms 
of evaluation for the public to assess. 
¶46 Q: I’m not sure whether this question—it may be too abstract of a 
case, so feel free to brush if off.  But I’m curious about your comment about 
how the Germans have come to kind of enshrine the notion of informational 
self-determination, and I’m thinking about that in contrast to HIPAA,44 
which is a really complicated piece of legislation.  A lot of its energy goes 
into trying to specify all sorts of situations that you can dream up about 
having processes and processes around processes for dealing with who gets 
access to information, as opposed to just kind of saying, “Information about 
you is yours; you get to decide and making a presumption that that drives 
the decision-making.”  As a matter of legal strategy, what do you think 
about those two processes?  One is a very elaborate specification in statute 
of things and the other is kind of setting out very general principles of who 
owns something.  
¶47 A:  I think the privacy field is somewhat lucky in this respect.  We 
have a set of organizing principles that are generally referred to as “fair 
information practices.”  Those are magical words in the privacy realm.  Fair 
information practices describe the allocation of rights and responsibilities in 
the collection and use of personal information.  Also, somewhat 
conveniently, all of the rights basically go to the individual who’s giving up 
the personal information, and all of the responsibilities go to the 
organization that obtains the information.  Now, these fair information 
practices are actually set out in places like the findings of the Privacy Act of 
1974.  I know they’re discussed in the HIPAA regulations, they’re also in 
the OECD Privacy Guidelines of 1980.45  You’ll see them in many different 
places, but it’s a set of principles numbered somewhere between five and 
eight, that talk about transparency, accountability, rights and remedies, and 
provide, again, metrics for evaluating the effectiveness of privacy statutes 
and regulations.  Now, the problem with HIPAA of course, is that it’s just 
enormous.  I mean a few years ago I was discussing with someone the 
possibility of publishing the HIPAA regulations (the Health Insurance 
Portability Accountability Act).  I wanted to publish a book, because we 
publish a lot of source material.  We publish a lot of the federal statutory 
laws, we publish international materials, and we talked about publishing the 
HIPAA regulations.  The regulations, without the public comment, ran 900 
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pages in the Federal Register.  And that’s that small 9-point type.  Can you 
imagine publishing a multi-volume set of federal regulations?  I mean, that 
would end up in someone’s trunk who needed the weight going through 
snow.  So we decided not to do that, and I’m very sympathetic to all the 
people working in the privacy field, who are doing HIPAA regulations.  
Although, I can also tell you that for the law students here exploring career 
opportunities, according to Money magazine, August 2003,46 the top hot job 
in the U.S. economy was chief privacy officer.  How’s that?  Nice six figure 
salary.  So I’m somewhat sympathetic to the people who are doing the 
HIPAA regulations, but I also know they’re pretty well compensated for 
going through those 900 pages of rules. 
46 Joan Caplin, Ellen McGirt & Amy Wilson, Make Your Fortune Part 2, 
MONEY, Aug. 2003, at 80. 
